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Deregulation is very much the fashion now, at least in the 
United States. That being so, there is a good chance (or 
glittering prospect) that over the years immediately ahead 
many U.S. companies will become freer to do as they 
want. Even our commercial banks, long tightly regulated, 
could become freer. We may see geographical restrictions 
relaxed. There has already been some relaxation of bal-
ance sheet restrictions, those that limit banks in what they 
can do. And, more to the point here, there may be more. 
Such is the present-day mood. 
Perhaps relaxing geographical restrictions would be in 
the public interest. But that relaxing balance sheet restric-
tions would be is far less clear. Many, quite a few aca-
demic experts included, have urged some relaxation or, in 
other words, that our banks be deregulated, although not 
completely. (As I use the word herein, deregulation is 
synonomous with relaxation of balance sheet restric-
tions.) Whatever proponents believe, however, no one has 
yet made a convincing case for deregulation. In my view, 
regulation is required because our deposit insurance, 
provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), is improperly priced, and the effect of the FDIC's 
pricing policy is to make insured banks riskier than they 
would otherwise be. Those who would deregulate must 
therefore explain why, even though the FDIC's insurance 
is improperly priced, deregulation nevertheless makes 
sense. 
In the United States, what any insured bank pays for its 
insurance depends only on the total of its eligible liabilities 
and the price set by the FDIC. The total of eligible 
liabilities is hardly an adequate measure of the risk of 
failure, though, and, as the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
requires, there is only one price for all insured banks. That 
price may vary with the FDIC's insurance fund, but since 
insured banks are not able effectively to supervise each 
other, there is nothing in the FDIC's pricing policy, 
prescribed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, to 
discourage risk-taking. 
Possibly the FDIC should be risk-rating insured banks 
and charging accordingly. So far as I am aware, however, 
no one has yet come close to a satisfactory measure of risk. 
And producing one would, I think, be a horrendous task. 
Then, too, there could be political trouble in charging 
banks different prices. So it may not be entirely appro-
priate to describe FDIC insurance as being improperly 
priced. Still, it is a fact that the FDIC is not at present 
charging insured banks according to the riskiness of their 
respective balance sheets. Nor is there any real prospect 
that it soon will be. That, as I argue later on, is why our 
insured banks must be regulated, probably at least as 
tightly as, although not necessarily in precisely the way, 
they currently are. 
Of course, my argument may be dead wrong. Possibly I 
have overlooked something. But until someone shows 
that, policymakers must, I believe, view deregulation as a 
chancy undertaking. 
It has often been claimed, mostly by academic experts, 
that we would have a better allocation of real resources if 
our banks were less restricted in their balance sheet 
choices. But that, it seems to me, is wrong. More likely 
than not, we would have a worse allocation. That is in 
effect what I argue in the first part of this essay. In the 
conventional view, balance sheet restrictions distort re-
source allocation. As applied to insured banks, though, 
they may not; rather, they may remove a distortion caused 
by the FDIC's pricing policy. And if they do, then some such restrictions are desirable. Or, as I suggested above, 
our insured banks should be regulated. 
It has also been claimed that our banks, ever so much 
more tightly regulated than, say, the money market mutual 
funds, are being treated unfairly. As I argue in the second 
part of this essay, though, that too is wrong. The liabili-
ties of the banks are insured by the FDIC or, as might bet-
ter be said, by the federal government, which includes the 
Federal Reserve System, and the liabilities of the money 
market funds are not. Thus, it is not that like companies 
are being treated differently or that our banks, although 
more tightly regulated than some of their marketplace foes, 
are being treated unfairly. Regulation is, as it were, the 
cost of having insured liabilities. 
Why Regulate? 
There is a view that insuring bank liabilities and regulating 
banks (that is, subjecting them to balance sheet restric-
tions) are alternative means to a single end. Consider the 
following passage, taken from the report of the President's 
Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation, which 
was chaired by Reed O. Hunt and is generally referred to, 
not surprisingly, as the Hunt commission: 
The introduction of deposit insurance, which halted runs on 
banks, was by far the most important reform of the [1930s]. 
Although the restrictions imposed on bank operations and 
more stringent requirements for entry into the banking 
business also reduced the risk to depositors and bank stock-
holders, the Commission believes that these were less 
important and were made largely redundant by deposit 
insurance. (Emphasis added.)
1 
Why only "largely redundant" is something of a mystery. 
Maybe the commission had in mind that the FDIC was 
not charged with insuring all of the liabilities of U.S. 
banks. In any event, what the underlying argument was 
seems clear enough. Before 1934 the objective of regula-
tion was to keep banks solvent or, in the words of the Hunt 
commission's predecessor, the Commission on Money 
and Credit, to safeguard "small depositors and the money 
supply."
2 But with the creation of the FDIC our banks 
became safe for most if not all creditors. And after 1933 
there was therefore no (or only slight) need to regulate 
them. 
That last statement is, however, a non sequitur. Banks 
can be safe for depositors and still be risky. So it does not 
follow that if depositors are insured, then there is nothing 
to worry about. If the price of insurance is unrelated to risk, 
as it is for banks in the United States, and if banks are not 
sufficiently bound by balance sheet restrictions, then there 
is something to worry about: banks' assets are excessively 
risky and real resources are therefore misallocated. 
Thus, insuring bank deposits (more generally, bank 
liabilities) is not a substitute for regulating banks or 
subjecting them to balance sheet restrictions. With the 
price of insurance unrelated to risk, regulation is a neces-
sary complement to insuring deposits. When deposits are 
risky, depositors insist on being compensated for assum-
ing greater risk. And by their insistence they discourage 
some risk-taking. When, however, deposits are risk-free, 
depositors do not insist on promised rates of return that 
vary with the riskiness of banks' balance sheets. So if the 
government has made depositors a solemn (and, rarer, 
credible) promise that whatever happens they will be paid 
back, then there is only the government to discourage risk-
taking by banks. In theory, it can do that by making banks 
pay fees or insurance premiums for being able to offer risk-
free deposits. But it must charge banks according to the 
riskiness of their respective balance sheets. The only 
alternative is to limit risk by regulating them. 
How Risky Should Banks Be? 
Even if it were certain that the FDIC will keep to its 
current pricing policy, or that the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act will be left unchanged, it would not follow that 
our insured banks should be very tightly regulated. Or that 
deregulating them would be foolish. There is the question 
of how risky those banks ought to be. 
The obvious answer (obvious for economists) is, I 
believe, the right one: as risky as they would be under the 
laissez-faire banking policy or, to define that policy, as 
risky as they would be if none of their liabilities were 
insured by government and they were not at all regulated. 
And if that is true, then there is a need to regulate our 
insured banks, although how tightly is something else 
again. That need is immediate, since insuring an unregu-
lated bank's liabilities, but at a price that is independent of 
risk, makes the bank riskier than it otherwise would be. 
Perhaps not everyone will grant that banks should be as 
risky as they would be under the laissez-faire banking 
policy. All I can say is that to date no one has argued 
convincingly that the number of bankruptcies under the 
xThe report of the President's Commission on Financial Structure and 
Regulation (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 44. 
2Money and credit: their influence on jobs, prices, and growth: the report of the 
Commission on Money and Credit (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1961), p. 161. 
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laissez-faire policy is not optimal and that, until someone 
has, the presumption must be that it is. To presume 
otherwise would be to suggest that somewhere along the 
way Adam Smith's invisible hand became arthritic. 
According to some, our own history shows that under 
the laissez-faire policy the banking industry is "inherently 
unstable" or, so to say, panic prone. Our history, however, 
shows no such thing. How could it? The United States has 
never tried the laissez-faire policy. But even if there were a 
convincing a priori or theoretical case for inherent insta-
bility, what would follow? Nothing, unless there were also 
a convincing case that bank failures have harmful third-
party effects. That has often been claimed, but so far no 
rigorous and detailed argument has appeared in the lit-
erature. 
On certain assumptions, there are no bank failures 
under the laissez-faire banking policy. If there is a private 
cost of going bust, a cost paid by stockholders before 
creditors get anything, and if creditors know what every 
bank portfolio will be worth whatever happens in the 
world, then all banks are perfectly safe—entirely free, that 
is, of any risk of default. That is what profit maximization 
implies.
3 It can reasonably be objected, though, that in-
formation is not costless and that the no-failures result is 
therefore suspect. If information about bank balance 
sheets costs something, then, in general, creditors are not 
perfectly informed and, for banks, being safe may not yield 
maximum profit. Thus, even under the laissez-faire poli-
cy, there could be some failures. 
That there is the possibility of some failures has an 
important (and, in a way, unfortunate) implication. As I 
have maintained, the objective in regulating insured banks 
is to keep them from being riskier than they would be under 
the laissez-faire banking policy or, equivalently, to keep 
bank failures down to about as many as there would be 
under that policy. But there is uncertainty about how many 
failures there would be. So it could be that at present our 
insured banks are too tightly regulated; it could be that for 
some years now the number of bank failures has been too 
low. Although I doubt that, I therefore cannot insist that 
deregulation would be foolish. But I can insist that so far no 
clear case for deregulation has been made. To make that 
case, someone must establish beyond reasonable doubt 
that under the laissez-faire policy banks would be riskier 
than they currently are or, in other words, that under the 
laissez-faire policy there would be more failures than there 
have been on average over, say, the postwar period. And 
much more is required than simply noting the numerous 
bank failures of the early 1930s. That there were many is 
irrelevant, for neither then nor before were our govern-
ments, federal and state, following the laissez-faire policy. 
Some Uninsured Bank Liabilities 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Act does not say that all 
creditors of insured banks are insured in full. Evidently, 
there are some creditors who are not. It is therefore natural 
to ask again whether there is any need to regulate insured 
banks. If some lenders are watching those banks, then why 
have balance sheet constraints and armies of examiners to 
ensure compliance with them? Why indeed? 
For one thing, economic theory tells us that having 
some uninsured liabilities, although it may help a little, 
does not make balance sheet constraints unnecessary. In 
general, unregulated banks will be riskier when some 
liabilities are insured than when none are. For, as was 
noted above, insured creditors do not have to be promised 
more (or in nonbankruptcy states be paid more) as the risk 
of default increases. Thus, if even only some liabilities are 
insured, then, however well informed creditors may be, 
there is advantage in being less than perfectly safe. 
There is another point. In the way it has gone about its 
business, the FDIC has made it quite reasonable for 
(supposedly) uninsured creditors to be unmindful of what 
their banks have been doing. When an insured bank has 
failed, or has been judged to have, the FDIC can simply 
pay off insured creditors. Alternatively, it can arrange for, 
to use the technical phrase, a purchase and assumption. 
That is, it can arrange for a still solvent bank to purchase 
the good assets of the failed bank and, in partial payment, 
assume all of the liabilities of that bank. The FDIC has 
handled most of the failures of the postwar period by 
purchase and assumption, so few have lost anything as a 
result of having made loans to insured banks. To quote 
Stanley Silverberg, the FDIC's Director of Research: 
Because of the way failed banks have been handled in recent 
years, data on the insured portion of deposits do not neces-
sarily mean much. 
The majority of bank failures and all failures involving 
banks with deposits of $100 million or more have been 
handled through purchase and assumption transactions. No 
depositor in a large bank failure has incurred any loss in 
recent decades In fact, no general creditor of a large bank 
3John H. Kareken and Neil Wallace, Deposit insurance and bank regulation: a 
partial-equilibrium exposition, Journal of Business 51 (July 1978): 424-26. 
3 that failed has incurred any loss.
4 
It will be recalled that when the Franklin National 
Bank's transgressions became public knowledge, the Fed-
eral Reserve kept it open long enough for nearly all 
uninsured creditors to get their money out. So it is not that 
the FDIC has been carrying on all by itself. Nor is it just 
that in most instances of failure the FDIC has in effect paid 
off all creditors, insured and uninsured alike. It has on 
occasion kept banks in trouble from going under. 
What the FDIC has done then, with a bit of help from 
the Federal Reserve, is make it very easy to believe that 
practically all of the liabilities of banks are insured. Of 
course, at some time in the future it may change its policy. 
Until it does, though, nominally uninsured creditors 
will not be as watchful as they would be if some had 
lost considerable sums. They will not be doing what, if 
truly uninsured, they might have been counted on to do. 
The Matter of Equity 
I have argued the need for regulating our insured commer-
cial banks and also, although not explicitly, made a case 
for regulating insured state-chartered banks as tightly as 
those with federal charters. State-chartered banks do not 
pay more or less for insurance than federally chartered 
banks. So there is no justification for regulating them 
more or less tightly or, going further, for having truly 
independent state regulatory agencies. A multiplicity of 
regulatory agencies may afford banks needed protection 
from government. But if so, then a mistake was made 
decades ago, when it was decided that state-chartered 
banks should be eligible for FDIC insurance. To be 
sure, they pretty much had to be made eligible, for one of 
the principal motives in creating the FDIC was to save 
the then smaller (or unit) banks, many of which had state 
charters, from oblivion. Salvation, though, hardly ever 
comes cheap. 
I have also made a case, although again not explicitly, 
for regulating our government-insured savings and loan 
associations, credit unions, and savings banks. The pric-
ing and failed-bank policies of the Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation and the National Credit 
Union Administration do not differ in essential ways from 
those of the FDIC. Not that savings and loan associa-
tions, for example, should necessarily be regulated as 
they have been. But if what I have argued is right, then 
they should be regulated. 
It may even be that other government-insured deposi-
tory institutions—savings and loan associations, credit 
unions, and savings banks—should be bound by about the 
same balance sheet restrictions as insured commercial 
banks. There is a suggestion that they should be in the 
justification for regulation that I have provided. 
There is another disparity in regulation. Our commer-
cial banks (and bank holding companies) are more tightly 
regulated than the money market mutual funds or, what 
may be a better contrast, the now emerging financial-ser-
vice conglomerates. The question, of course, is what to do 
about the disparity. That has of late been much debated. 
Some have maintained that because of the disparity 
our banks are at a serious and unfair competitive disad-
vantage and that either the money market fUnds should be 
more tightly regulated or the banks should be less so. The 
money market funds, or at least those that offer third-
party payments services, might be made to hold cash re-
serves. And the banks might be allowed to pay whatever 
interest rates they think appropriate and issue whatever 
kinds of liabilities they want. If they could, then we would 
not see funds making money by borrowing from the pub-
lic and lending to banks. 
What has been quite overlooked, though, in the discus-
sion of what to do about the disparity in regulation is that 
the liabilities of the money market funds are not insured by 
the government. The money market funds do not have an 
FDIC of their own. Nor has the Federal Reserve publicly 
committed itself to helping them out, should they get into 
trouble. Thus, although our banks are more tightly regu-
lated than the money market funds, that does not mean 
that they are necessarily at a competitive disadvantage. 
The money market funds can do some things that the 
banks cannot. But they cannot offer government-insured 
liabilities. And interestingly, households and companies 
(among them, so-called institutional investors) would 
seem to know that. Casual observation indicates that they 
are very much aware of what money market fund balance 
sheets are, much more aware than of what bank balance 
sheets are. Nor is it accidental that funds and banks differ 
so in their balance sheets. 
At this moment, depositors may not see much value in 
government insurance. Fifty years is a longtime to remem-
ber anything, even a banking crisis of impressive propor-
tions; and for much of our population that crisis is not 
something lived through, but only a story told by parents 
4Stanley C. Silverberg, Implications of changes in the effective level of deposit 
insurance coverage, in Proceedings of a conference on bank structure and 
competition (Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1980), p. 209. 
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and historians. So the possibility that with existing interest 
rate ceilings, banks are in fact (or have long been) at a 
competitive disadvantage cannot be dismissed out-of-
hand. Then, too, banks may be paying too much for their 
insurance. That they are is not obvious, since the cost of 
ensuring compliance with balance sheet restrictions is 
more than the FDIC spends. Still, there is the possibility 
that the FDIC is charging too much, and that is a second 
reason why its insurance ought to be truly voluntary. 
Simply making FDIC insurance voluntary would 
almost certainly not give banks the freedom that, according 
to bankers, they require. It is nearly beyond imagining that 
in making insurance voluntary, Congress and state legisla-
tures (or regulatory agencies) would exempt uninsured 
banks from all or even most balance sheet restrictions. 
Nor apparently is near-complete freedom necessary. In 
the opinion of many bankers, it would seem, it will suf-
fice to get rid of interest rate ceilings and restrictions on 
the maturities and denominations of bank liabilities. 
And, indeed, that has been promised. 
It is, however, a clear implication of the existence of 
FDIC insurance, priced as it is, that getting rid of interest 
rate ceilings is not something to be done casually. Doing 
that would be to deregulate, for restricting banks in their 
borrowing is one way of limiting the FDIC's exposure. I 
do not say that having interest rate ceilings is a particularly 
good way of keeping the FDIC's exposure down, but only 
that if those ceilings are removed, then other balance 
sheet restrictions must be made more stringent. Fortu-
nately, the reality is that a company does not have to have 
a bank charter to be, for all practical purposes, a bank. 
Undeniably, Merrill Lynch has shown that. Thus, bankers 
do have a genuine choice. If they feel too bound by 
regulation, then they can, as it were, go over to the other 
side. Although it is more easily threatened than done, they 
can give up their bank charters. 
Conclusion 
Virtually all of the liabilities of our banks are insured, in the 
first instance, by the FDIC, and the FDIC does not take 
risk into account in charging for its insurance. Those are 
facts, known to nearly all. They have been almost com-
pletely ignored, though, by those who have advocated 
deregulation. And that is too bad, for it means that what 
they have had to say adds up to precious little. 
That we have the insurance arrangement we do is basic. 
Since we do, our insured banks must be regulated. Other 
government-insured depository institutions must be too. 
As I remarked earlier, that is not to say that the insured 
banks, or any of the other government-insured depository 
institutions, must be regulated exactly as they are at pres-
ent. I have not shown that or, indeed, that any deregu-
lation would be foolish. But what I have done, or so I 
hope, is remind those interested in the regulation of banks 
that the obvious has been ignored and, further, that a 
convincing case for deregulation has yet to be made. 
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